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【ABSTRACT】Jerry Fodor and Ernest Lepore (1999/2002) frame the debate 
over meaning holism in terms of a distinction between meaning atomism and 
meaning anatomism. The former holds that the meaning of an expression E is 
determined by some relation between E and some extra-linguistic entity. The 
latter holds that the meaning of E is at least partly determined by some of E’s 
“inward” relations (IRs) with other expressions in the very language. They 
(1992) argue that meaning anatomism inevitably collapses into meaning 
holism, which is the view that the meaning of E is determined by E’s IRs 
with every other expression in the very language because there is no 
principled distinction for the anatomist to divide the meaning-determining 
IRs from the non-meaning-determining ones. In response, the non-holistic 
anatomist urges that Fodor and Lepore’s no-principled-basis consideration is 
groundless because the lack of a generally accepted criterion for such a 
distinction does not undermine the viability of the distinction itself. While 
this point is well taken, I think that Fodor and Lepore are onto an important 
question here. That is, what does it make non-holistic anatomism distinctive 
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from its holistic counterpart if without a principled basis for the distinction 
among IRs? I look into this question and give an alternative argument from 
Fodor and Lepore’s to suggest that non-holistic anatomism cannot bypass the 
no-principled-basis consideration. The non-holistic anatomist will need a 
principled distinction in kind between IRs to back her point.
Ⅰ. Meaning Anatomism and Some of the Problems of 
Meaning Atomism 
Jerry Fodor and Ernest Lepore (1999/2002) frame the debate over 
meaning holism (hereafter holism) in terms of a distinction between 
meaning atomism (hereafter atomism) and meaning anatomism (hereafter 
anatomism). The former holds that the meaning of an expression E is 
determined by some “outward” relation (OR) between E and some 
extra-linguistic entity,1) and the latter holds that the meaning of E is at 
least partly determined by some of E’s “inward” relations (IRs) with 
other expressions in the very language.2) The idea of anatomism comes 
from the criticism of atomism (Fodor & Lepore, 1999/2002, p. 11). If the 
meaning of an expression E is determined by some OR between E and 
some extra-linguistic entity as atomism maintains, then whenever there is 
identity of ORs, there must by identity of meaning. However, there are 
examples where two expressions have the same OR but different meanings. 
1) Some candidates of OR include association, causation, reference, correspondence, 
and so forth. It is a popular statement that it is in terms of these ORs that expressions 
have their meanings. For some examples in the literature, see J. Fodor & E. Lepore 
(1999/2002, p. 11).
2) Some candidates of IR include inferential relations, conceptual connections, 
interdependence, or syntagmatic.and associative (now usually called “paradigmatic”) 
relations (in Ferdinand de Saussure’s structuralism).
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Consider Gottlob Frege’s example of ‘Phosphorus’ and ‘Hesperus’. The 
relations between the two expressions and an extra-linguistic entity, Venus, 
OR(‘Phosphorus’, Venus) and OR(‘Hesperus’, Venus), are the same, but 
the two expressions do not have the same meaning. ‘Phosphorus’ means 
the morning star, and ‘Hesperus’ means the evening star. Thus there must 
be something other than OR which at least partly determines the meaning 
of an expression E. For anatomism, it is the “inward” relations (IRs) 
among expressions to play this role. Anatomism holds that E’s IRs with 
other expressions in the very language must take part in determining E’s 
meaning. In this way, anatomism can claim that ‘Phosphorus’ and 
‘Hesperus’ have different meanings because they have different IRs and 
thus different determinants of their meanings.
Emma Borg (2010) recently also posts similar challenges to the 
explanatory adequateness of the atomistic theories. She lists four 
“intra-linguistic” features that the atomistic accounts seem doomed to fail 
to predict or explain. For these features involve the syntactic interactions 
of expressions, phenomena a semantic theory with ORs as the only 
determinants of meaning lacks resources to cope with. They demonstrate 
what she calls the “intra-linguistic burden on semantics” which “concerns 
properties of, and relations among, expressions” (Borg, 2012, pp. 167-8).
Firstly, consider the possible and impossible readings for natural 
language sentences. 
(1a) Jack is too clever to catch Jim.
(1b) Jack is too clever to catch. 
(2a) Jill is eager to please.
(2b) Jill is easy to please. 
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Despite the surface similarities of each pair of these sentences, they 
require very different readings. For example, while Jack and Jill are the 
agents of (1a) and (2a) respectively, they do not play this role in (1b) and 
(2b). It is argued that an adequate semantic theory must explain the 
difference as such. To do that, however, “we need to appeal to more than 
the syntactic structure of the sentence and the denotational content of the 
terms involved” (Borg, 2010, p. 61), and yet, the task seems beyond what 
atomism is able to offer. For, as Borg (2010, p. 61) correctly points out, 
for the current example, it does not help to simply say that ‘easy’ means, 
say, the property of being easy.3)
Moreover, the phenomenon of syntactic interactions of expressions 
seems everywhere. Consider the second case in Borg’s list―verb 
behaviors. The observation suggests that there is a sort of non-arbitrary 
patterns of syntactic distribution in verb behaviors which an adequate 
semantic theory is expected to explain and predict. For example, the fact 
that some of the following sentences are admissible but some are not 
suggests there are different patterns how these verbs behave (Borg, 2010, 
p. 62).
(3a) I hit the wall with the bat.
(3b) I hit the bat against the wall.
(4a) I cut the rope with the knife.
(4b) *I cut the knife against a rope.
(5a) She touched the cat with her hand.
(5b) *She couched her hand against the cat.
According to Borg (2010), we can say that (4b) and (5b) are not 
admissible because ‘cut’ and ‘touch’, unlike ‘hit’, do not “care about the 
3) See also P. M. Pietroski, (2005, pp. 263-264).
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kind of motion which precedes the contact” (p. 62). Something is a hit 
“not merely if it makes a specific kind of contact but also if it involves a 
certain kind of motion beforehand,” but there is nothing like that 
involved with a cut or a touch (Borg, 2010, p. 62). Again, this kind of 
explanation seems something that atomism is short of. Nothing in the 
claim that ‘hit’ means HIT, ‘cut’ means CUT, or ‘touch’ means TOUCH 
can help explain the patterns of the behaviors of these verbs.4)
The third group of semantic relations on Borg’s list of the intra- 
linguistic burden of semantics includes relations such as synonymy, 
analyticity, entailment, and polysemy. Suppose ‘vixen’ and ‘female fox’ 
are synonymous. How can atomism show that the meaning of ‘vixen’ is 
somehow a combination of the meaning of ‘female’ and ‘fox’? How can 
atomism capture the inferential relation between ‘red’ and ‘colored’ or 
‘dog’ and ‘mammal’? How can atomism explain the facts that words can 
have “multiple meanings where those meanings seem related to one 
another in non-arbitrary ways” (Borg, 2010, p. 64)?
Some of these relations may be easier to handle than others. Someone 
like Michael Devitt may respond that, say, it is in terms of the fact that 
‘vixen’ refers to anything that ‘female’ and ‘fox’ both refer to that ‘vixen’ 
and ‘female fox’ are synonymous.5) Polysemy is probably the most 
challenging case here. Consider the meaning of ‘book’ as in ‘the book 
weighs two pounds’ versus ‘the book is in every shop in the city’ where 
‘book’ has different meanings in each sentence (Borg, 2010, p. 64).6) As 
Michael Dummett (1976/1993) says, “any acceptable theory of meaning 
must give recognition to the interconnectedness of language” (p. 43), 
cases like this seem to suggest that we cannot exclude the contribution of 
4) I use capital letters to indicate the name of the meaning assigned to the indicated 
expression.
5) See M. Devitt (1996, pp. 18-26).
6) See also Borg (2012, p. 172).
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the linguistic environment that an expression E is within when 
considering the meaning of E.7)
The fourth case in Borg’s discussion is “impossible words.” They are 
words that “do not occur in any natural language, despite their having 
apparently cogent meanings” (Borg, 2010, p. 64), and it is thought that 
their absence is not an accident “in the way that it is an accident[, say,] 
that there is no noun that picks out one’s tallest friend’s relatives” (K. 
Johnson, 2004, p. 334) and thus need to be explained. It becomes another 
challenge to atomism if that is the case. For example, we can say 
someone broke something but not something bliked someone (where 
‘bliked’ means ‘was broken by’). One suggestion of the explanation of 
the absence of the impossible word ‘blik’ is to attribute it to a general 
fact “that whenever a transition verb of English expresses a relation 
between the doer of an action and the thing that is acted upon . . . the 
former is the subject of the verb and the latter is the object” (Johnson, 
2004, p. 334). Such explanation seems nothing an atomistic theory can 
afford.8)
All these cases provide a strong demonstration that lexicons contain 
more information than simply pairing expressions with extra-linguistic 
entities. Lexicons contain also additional “rules which indicate the kinds 
of arguments [they] can take and the rules of composition relevant to 
those different arguments” (Borg, 2012, p.196). As Borg points out, there 
are some complex patterns of the syntactic interactions of expressions in 
natural language that require us “to appeal to the complex structures and 
information” in the lexicons (Borg, 2010, p. 65). That it is not enough to 
7) For similar remarks, see also Devitt (1996, p. 11); A. Bilgrami (1998); M. 
Greenberg & G. Harman (2006); J. Peregrin (2008).
8) See also J. Collins’s (2011) where he argues “only on the assumption that lexical 
items contain a semantically relevant structure can we plausibly explain why certain 
would-be verbs are impossible” (p. 235).
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have ORs as the only determinants of meaning gives us reason not to be 
an atomist but an anatomist.
Ⅱ. Holistic and Non-holistic Meaning Anatomism 
Fodor and Lepore (1992, pp. 23-25) believe that the renouncement of 
atomism inevitably leads to holism, the extreme version of anatomism 
which holds that the meaning of E is determined by E’s IRs with every 
other expression in the very language. They argue that once we allow the 
IRs of E to take part in determining the meaning of E and follow W. V. 
Quine to deny the analytic/synthetic distinction, as they think we should, 
it is unlikely that there is a principled distinction to tell the meaning- 
determining IRs from the non-meaning-determining ones. Consequently, 
we get holism. The argument can be written as follows:
(6) Anatomism: that the meaning of E is at least partly determined by 
some of E’s IRs with other expressions in the very language. 
(7) No-principled-basis consideration: that there is no principled 
distinction to divide the meaning-determining IRs from the 
non-meaning-determining ones.
(8) Holism. [from (6) and (7)] 
In response, the non-holistic anatomist urges that Fodor and Lepore’s 
“no-principled-basis consideration,” as Devitt (1996, p. 12) calls it, is 
groundless because the lack of a generally accepted criterion for 
distinguishing meaning-determining IRs from those are not does not 
undermine the viability of the distinction itself. It does not follow from 
the claim that the distinction is indeterminate that there is no distinction 
Chun-Ping Yen208
at all.9) Accordingly, the non-holistic anatomist rejects (7), and thus (8) 
does not follow.
I think that the non-holistic anatomist’s point is well taken. Fodor and 
Lepore do not successfully justify (7), and their argument is not decisive. 
There can still be a principled distinction for the non-holistic anatomist to 
divide IRs. Nontheless, I think Fodor and Lepore are onto an important 
question here. That is, what does it make non-holistic anatomism 
distinctive from its holistic counterpart if without a principled basis for 
the distinction among IRs? In section II.1, I give an alternative argument 
from Fodor and Lepore’s to suggest that non-holistic anatomism cannot 
bypass the no-principled-basis consideration. The challenge of the 
no-principled-basis consideration remains, and the non-holistic anatomist 
needs a principled distinction dividing IRs to make her claim that not all 
IRs of E can be the meaning determinants of E.
1. Reconsider the No-principled-basis Consideration
As aforementioned, holism is the extreme version of anatomism. Like 
atomism, it characterizes a determination relation that such-and-such 
determines so-and-so. I suggest that we understand these doctrines in the 
way we understand other determination relations. It is generally held that 
a determination claim entails that only the cited determinants enter into 
the determination of the determinable. That is to say, the cited 
determinants are necessary and jointly sufficient for determining the 
cited determinable. Accordingly, the truth of holism depends on the 
following facts:
9) See P. A. Boghossian (1996, p. 384); J. Perry (1994); Devitt (1996; pp. 87-94); N. 
Block (1998).
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(9) that there is no additional determinant other than the cited 
determinants (IR1, IR2, …, IRn, of E to every other expression in the 
given language), and
(10) that the cited determinable (E’s meaning) does depend on each 
cited determinant (IR1, IR2, …, IRn, of E).10)
Holism is falsifiable as understood this way. One can demonstrate 
holism as flawed with a counterexample of either (9) or (10).11) The 
intuition behind non-holistic anatomism in the literature is the idea that 
not all IRs of E are meaning determining for E. It is claimed that there 
must be a few crucial IRs, but not all, play the role because it seems 
obvious that only relatively small subset of the IRs of E is to really affect 
the meaning of E.
One might think, for example, that if the change of the IR between 
‘bachelor’ and ‘frustrated’ does not affect the meaning of ‘bachelor’ as 
that of the IR between ‘bachelor’ and ‘unmarried’ does, then there seems 
no ground to say that the IR between ‘bachelor’ and ‘frustrated’ is one of 
the determinants of the meaning of ‘bachelor.’12) The seemingly 
difference between the IR between ‘bachelor’ and ‘unmarried’ and the IR 
between ‘bachelor’ and ‘frustrated’ gives a reason to think that we do 
have a principled distinction in kind between IRs. The IR between 
‘bachelor’ and ‘unmarried’ is a determinant of the meaning of ‘bachelor’, 
while the IR between ‘bachelor’ and ‘frustrated’ is not. 
What can examples like this buy for non-holistic anatomism? Not 
much, I am afraid. Firstly, we need to carefully note what such 
determination does and does not imply. A determination claim only tells 
10) This explication of determination is in debt to Martin L. Jönsson (2008, pp. 22-3).
11) For example, non-holistic anatomism, if true, presents a counterexample against 
(10) and thus against holism.
12) The example is from Devitt (1996, p. 30).
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us that if the determinants are the same, then the determinable must 
remain the same. It does not imply that whenever there is a change in one 
(or more) of the determinants, the determinable must change accordingly. 
It does not imply differences on the determinants side must lead to 
differences on the determinable side, either. These may not be evident 
when we think of meaning atomism which has only one determinant of 
the meaning of E. But consider other determination claims for a second. 
Take Newton’s second law of motion for example (Z. G. Szabó, 2010, 
pp. 256-257). It states that mass and acceleration jointly determine force
―F (Force) = m (mass) * a (acceleration). Or consider the claim that 
one’s final letter grade in a class is determined by the result of one’s 
exams, quizzes and attendance (H. Jackman, 1999). Suppose we change 
the values of all the determinants, will the value of the determinable in 
these examples change as well? Not necessarily. For there can be 
different combination of the determinants with the same result. We talk 
about determination like this all the time. The relation between the 
determinants and the determinable considered here is like that. When 
there is a change in the IR between ‘bachelor’ and ‘frustrated’ on the 
determinants side, it is not supposed that the change of the meaning of 
‘bachelor’ will follow on the determinable side. We need a reason other 
than that the change of the IR between ‘bachelor’ and ‘frustrated’ does 
not affect the meaning of ‘bachelor’ in order to exclude the IR between 
‘bachelor’ and ‘frustrated’ as one of the determinants of the meaning of 
‘bachelor’. The non-holistic anatomist does not offer us one such reason.
Secondly, the example of bachelor may appear as a counterexample 
against (10), but it is not. To make the case of bachelor a counterexample 
against (10), we need to show not only 
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(11) that the meaning of ‘bachelor’ stay intact when the change of the 
IR between ‘bachelor’ and ‘frustrated’ occurs, but also 
(12) that none of the other IRs of ‘bachelor’ is affected by the change 
of the IR between ‘bachelor’ and ‘frustrated’.
The condition (12) appears a sheer difficulty to demonstrate, given the 
interdependence among “the cited determinants of E” in (10). The non- 
holistic anatomist’s belief that it is not the case that all IRs of E are 
meaning determinants of E is groundless without suitable counterexamples 
against (10). In that case, the non-holistic anatomist will need a 
principled distinction in kind between IRs to back her point. A principled 
distinction to divide IRs is still needed in order for non-holistic 
anatomism to be a well-motivated alternative to holism. Otherwise, why 
not simply go all the way to holism after renouncing atomism? 
Surprisingly, given the popularity of non-holistic anatomism in the 
debate over holism, few theorists take the no-principled-basis 
consideration seriously enough to respond to it.13) As of my knowledge, 
Devitt is one rare exception among non-holistic anatomists who has 
made an effort to live up to the demand of the no-principled-basis 
consideration. In the rest of the paper, I will argue that while Devitt’s 
non-holistic anatomism is well-motivated with a principled basis for the 
distinction between meaning-determining IRs and non-meaning- 
determining ones, he provides no reason to favor non-holistic anatomism 
over holism.
13) Paul Horwich is one of these anatomists. He (1998, pp. 59-60) maintains that only 
some but not all IRs of E can determine the meaning of E without giving a 
principled distinction in kind between IRs. 
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Ⅲ. Devitt’s Non-holistic Meaning Anatomism 
Devitt rightly points out the reason that we need a principled basis for 
counting an IR as meaning-determining is because we need such a 
criterion for counting any factor as meaning-determining. On his view, it 
is a demand applies not only to non-holistic anatomism but to any theory 
of meaning (Devitt, 1997, p. 378). He (2001) takes “[t]he meaning of a 
word [as] its property of referring to something in a certain way, its mode 
of reference” (p. 461) and think that IRs are meaning-determining only 
when they are reference-determining. Thus, for him, IRs are divided into 
two groups. One are reference-determining, and the other are not. Only 
the former group can determine meaning. Devitt’s account provides a 
principled basis for the distinction between meaning-determining IRs and 
non-meaning-determining ones and thus is a well-motivated alternative 
to holism.
Meanings, according to Devitt, are supposed to serve at least two 
semantic purposes: to explain one’s behavior, and to use one’s thoughts 
and utterances as guides to reality (Devitt, 1996, pp. 57–60). To 
understanding what meanings are, for him, is to determine which 
properties to ascribe for these two purposes.14) He conducts three 
arguments for his version of non-holistic anatomism which holds that 
ORs (causal links, the semantically significant relations of expressions to 
the world, for him) must be taken into account for meaning 
determination (Devitt, 1996, p. 160). If I understand it correctly, on this 
account, there must be at least some expressions which are semantically 
14) For example, suppose that A is in a kitchen, drinking from a glass that was filled 
from the tap. Why is A drinking it? Devitt would take the putative meanings as the 
properties ascribed to explain A’s behavior for the reason that these properties serve 
one of the semantic purposes: they explain A’s behavior. 
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self-standing in the sense that their meanings are determined by the 
causal links they possess with objects in the world. But is there any good 
reason to support his theory? Let’s scrutinize his arguments to find out.
1. The Argument from Representationalism
One of the arguments for non-holistic anatomism proposed by Devitt 
is based on Representationalism. Representationalism, as Devitt has it, is 
a truth-referential theory of meaning which holds that meanings are 
entirely constituted by representational properties, i.e. properties that 
determine reference or truth-conditions. According to this view, ORs are 
required to explain truth conditions.15) It maintains that the meaning of an 
expression in a sentence is determined by its contribution to the truth 
condition of that sentence (Devitt & K. Sterelny, 1999, p. 22).16) If 
meanings are entirely constituted by referential properties, as 
Representationalism has it, then they cannot be holistic.
As Devitt admits, this argument is very theory-laden (Devitt, 1996, p. 
15) According to Devitt and K. Sterelny (1999, p. 20), truth conditions describe states of 
affair in the world which have to hold for a given sentence to be true. It is the 
property of a sentence in virtue of which it is true if a certain situation in the world 
obtains and not true if that situation does not obtain. It is claimed that the meaning 
of a sentence is exhausted by its truth condition, and the truth condition represented 
by the sentence is the core of the meaning of the sentence.
16) For example, consider a simple sentence S, ‘Snow is white’. The sentence is true if 
and only if snow is white. The truth of the sentence depends on the sentence having 
the simple structure of a one-place predication. It also depends on its containing  
‘snow’, referring to snow, and ‘is white’, referring to white things. The sentence has 
its truth condition in virtue of the facts that there is some object that ‘snow’ refers 
to, and that ‘white’ applies to that object. In virtue of the truth condition of a 
sentence, we can identify linguistic items across, say, languages. For example, one 
can say that the German sentence ‘Schnee ist wiess’ and the French sentence ‘La 
neige est blanche’ mean the same thing because they have the same truth-condition 
that snow is white.
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135). It assumes Representationalism which bears specific weight on the 
idea that reference-determining conditions yield meaning-constitutive 
features. Although Devitt takes a strong Representationalist approach, he 
is aware of the problem that it will raise controversy in the current debate 
if we rest our opposition to holism on any specific semantic theory. 
Hence Representationalism can only play an auxiliary role in support of 
non-holistic anatomism. The power of Devitt’s arguments against holism 
relies mainly on the other independent arguments discussed below. If 
they work, we have a strong reason to favor non-holistic anatomism. If 
they don’t, the argument from Representationalism by itself will appear 
weak anyway due to its theory-laden characteristics. If that is the case, 
the room of arguing for holistic accounts remains.
2. The Argument from the Success of Meaning Ascriptions
Devitt argues that the success of our ascriptions of meaning provides a 
good reason to suppose that meaning is non-holistic rather than holistic. 
For, according to Devitt, we ascribe to others’ expressions shared 
meaning in ordinary circumstances, and shared meaning cannot be 
holistic. Suppose that A is in a kitchen, drinking from a glass that was 
filled from the tap. Why is A drinking it? The following attitude 
ascription serves as a plausible explanation: ‘A wants her thirst quenched 
and believes that water quenches thirst’. What properties are we 
attributing to ‘water’ in ascribing the belief that water quenches thirst to 
A? Devitt would claim that while we are presumably attributing 
properties of ‘water’ that capture the way in which A represents reality, 
we are not attributing all of the inferential properties of the word since, 
for him, only some of the properties are actually shared across 
individuals. That our ascribing the putative meaning of ‘water’ 
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successfully explains A’s behavior shows that meaning of ‘water’ must 
be non-holistic because only non-holistic meaning can be shared and thus 
can serve the task of explaining A’s behavior.
Joseph Levine raises a question that one may naturally wonder about 
this argument. After all, “[i]t is one thing to say that our explanatory 
practice is successful and that it involves the attribution of properties of a 
certain sort (the sort the moderate localist endorses) and another to say 
that it’s in virtue of the properties attributed that it’s successful” (Levine, 
1997, p. 67). If P successfully explains Q, it does not follow that P 
determines the success of the explanation of Q. That the match was 
struck could successfully explain why it lit, but the lighting is not 
determined by the striking. The lighting of the match is determined by 
the striking and the presence of oxygen, the dryness of the match, and so 
forth. Without the existence of other factors, even if the match was 
struck, it would not light. We cannot obtain a nomologically or 
metaphysically necessity of non-holistic properties from Devitt’s 
argument unless the success of our ascriptions is proved to be completely 
determined by the non-holistic properties.
Devitt is quite aware of the problem which worries Levine as he 
admits that the argument from the success of our ascriptions does not 
rule out the possibility of holistic meanings (Devitt, 1996, p. 127). 
Nevertheless, he chooses to stick with the faith on the effectiveness of 
the evidence in our folk practice. Given the support that for the most part, 
we have been successfully ascribing to each other certain attitudes to 
tokens with certain non-holistic properties, Devitt urges that we can have 
strong confidence on non-holistic anatomism unless there is a powerful 
alternative explanation of the success of these ascriptions.
I am not as optimistic about this as Devitt is. Levine’s challenge is 
exactly to the point that we cannot derive the normative non-holistic 
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anatomism from the descriptive premise. Moreover, I think holism can 
provide an alternative explanation of the success of meaning ascriptions 
as Devitt demands because holistic meanings, like their non-holistic 
counterparts, are sharable either across individuals or time slices. Even if 
we agree with Devitt’s observation that people ascribe to others’ 
expressions shared meaning in ordinary circumstances, there is no 
ground to think that the ascribed meaning is non-holistic rather than 
holistic.
The problem alleged here as a challenge to holism is that the change of 
meaning becomes so global and overwhelming as holism seems to imply 
that it is impossible for the meaning of an expression E in one’s language 
to be the same at different times and for the meaning of E to be the same 
in different individuals’ languages. In other words, it is necessarily not 
the case that the meaning of E in one’s language is the same at different 
times and that the meaning of E is the same in different individuals’ 
languages. But then, as we have noted in section II.1, this is not a 
problem that holism is committed to. Different determinants can result in 
the same determinable.17) Sharing meaning across systems is no miracle 
to holism, for holism does not dismiss the possibility that the meaning of 
E stays the same when there is a change in one (or more) of its IRs. 
Holism has all we need for meanings to be “stable” in the sense that it is 
possible for meanings to be shared because all that is required is for it to 
be possible that the meaning of E stays the same across time slices or 
individuals.
17) For example, if meaning determines reference, then despite the fact that ‘Phosphorus’ 
and ‘Hesperus’ have different meanings, they can still have the same referents. 
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3. The Argument from Our Interest in Generality
According to Devitt (1996), “we ascribe meanings to explain behavior” 
(p. 126, italics in the original). In searching for meanings that are suited 
for playing the explanatory role, Devitt claims, we want to allow for 
common explanations of the common behavior of different individuals, 
but then, he adds, only non-holistic meanings can be shared across 
individuals. It seems an undeniable doctrine that we have an interest in 
generality accompanying any semantic purpose we may have. There is a 
pervasive worry among philosophers that holistic meanings do not have 
the sort of generality we are interested in semantics because of the 
following concern which Devitt shares:
Holistic meanings would be so difficult to learn, teach, and use. . . . The 
more holistic the meaning, the more the theory that would have to be 
grasped; and more the likely variation from person to person, time to 
time; and so on. (Devitt, 1996, p. 124, n. 13).18)
Among the various challenges which holism faces, Devitt regards the 
failure of meeting our interest in generality as most serious (Devitt 1996: 
7). On his view, the putative meaning has to be common and peculiar to 
the tokens to which one ascribes the very meaning in order to be shared. 
Non-holistic properties are constituted by only a few of the relations of 
18) Take ‘water’ for example. According to Devitt’s line of thinking, the more holistic 
the meaning, the more IRs would be included to determine the meaning of ‘water’. 
Consider IR1 between, say, ‘x is water’ and ‘x quenches thirst’ and IR2 between ‘x is 
water’ and ‘x is H2O’. The meaning of ‘water’ determined by both IR1 and IR2, on 
Devitt’s view, would be more holistic than the meaning of ‘water’ determined only 
by one of the two IRs. Devitt thinks that in the former case, the meaning of ‘water’ 
is less likely to share across individuals than in the latter case because those who 
embrace one of the two IRs may not embrace the other one. The more holistic the 
meaning, the less likely for the meaning to be shared.
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any token that has them and so they have the feature to be shared by 
many things. Holistic properties, on the contrary, are more unlikely to be 
shared since they are constituted by a large proportion of the inferential 
properties of its tokens.19) Therefore, he concludes that only non-holistic 
properties can meet our interest in generality and serve our purposes of 
explaining behaviors. Holistic properties are too fine-grained to meet our 
interest in generality. According to Devitt, this explains the non-holistic 
doctrine why we tend to ascribe non-holistic properties rather than 
holistic ones.20)
Once again, Devitt’s arguments rely heavily on the idea that holistic 
meanings cannot be shared across individuals, a pervasive misunderstanding 
among the opponents of holism. As noted in section III.2, holistic 
meanings can be shared across time slices or individuals. The fact that 
we successfully ascribe shared meanings to others’ thoughts and 
utterances thus fail to serve as a criterion on whether meanings are 
holistic or not as Devitt supposes.
This concludes my argument that Devitt’s non-holistic anatomism is 
not well-grounded. While Devitt’s account does provide a principled 
basis to draw the distinction among IRs and thus is a well-motivated 
alternative to holism in the sense discussed in section II.1, a good reason 
to support his account over holism is still wanting. 
19) Devitt (1996, pp. 10-15) prefer talking about the meaning of word-tokens rather 
than of word-types. For him, IRs are inferential properties of word-tokens.
20) Cf. Devitt (1996, pp. 125-127). See also Fodor (1987, Ch. 3); Fodor & Lepore 
(1992) for a similar point.
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Ⅳ. Conclusion
This paper explores the motivation of non-holistic anatomism. The 
problem that ORs cannot solely determine the meaning of an expression 
gives rise to anatomism, and the intuition of the existence of some 
principled distinction between the meaning-determining IRs and the 
non-meaning-determining ones gives reason to support non-holistic 
anatomism. I argue that this intuition cannot stand once we take a close 
look. Instead, non-holistic anatomism needs a principled distinction in 
kind between IRs to set a criteria for what counts as meaning determining 
factors in the theory. As Devitt points out, it is a criterion that any theory 
of meaning should equip us with, and non-holistic anatomism is no 
exception. Devitt himself gives a well-motivated account of non-holistic 
anatomism on the ground that it specifies that meaning determining 
factors must be reference-determining. Thus, on his account, the criterion 
for an IR to be meaning determining is for it to be reference-determining. 
Devitt’s arguments for non-holistic anatomism are futher examined and 
rejected. While Devitt’s account demonstrates a well-motivated 
non-holistic version of anatomism, he fails to give reason why we should 
favor non-holistic anatomism over the holistic one. To conclude, a 
well-grounded non-holistic version of anatomism to defeat holism is still 
in absence.21)
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